Reporting Without Accountability: Legislative Scrutiny of Executive Reports in Indonesia

Abstract

Indonesian heads of region submit an annual accountability report to the regional legislature, which responds with formal recommendations. The arrangement carries the vocabulary of accountability without its constitutional structure: the legislature cannot reject the report, cannot remove the executive on its basis, and possesses no statutory mechanism compelling implementation of what it recommends. This study examined what such an arrangement can achieve, drawing on the international literature on legislative oversight and recommendation follow-up. The method is doctrinal legal analysis combined with structured review of empirical studies published between 2017 and 2024. Three findings emerge. First, constitutional analysis establishes that Indonesian heads of region were accountable to the legislature only during 1945-1958 and 1999-2004, and now merely report rather than remain accountable, so the recommendation instrument operates without the sanction that gives oversight its force elsewhere. Second, the international evidence indicates that follow-up is weak even where sanctions exist: British parliamentary practice tracking 615 recommendations across fourteen progress reports yields limited insight into implementation quality and is vulnerable to gaming. Third, Indonesian evidence on audit recommendation follow-up finds implementation ineffective and, in one national study of 72 ministries, unrelated to governance outcomes. The study argues that recommendation quality is a necessary but insufficient reform target, and that the binding constraint is the absence of any consequence for non-implementation.